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CONSIDERATION FOR EMPLOYEE NONCOMPETITION
COVENANTS IN EMPLOYMENTS AT VILL
INTRODUCTION
Covenants not to compete have become an increasingly frequent
source of employment litigation. In many cases, the employment rela-
tionship has been for an unspecified term, that is, "at will."' Whether
employment at will supplies consideration to support an employee's
promise not to compete is a point of controversy that has persisted for
decades.2
1. When the agreement does not specify a term regarding termination, courts imply
a term allowing either party to terminate at will. E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.17, at 532
(1982). Many courts are departing from the traditional approach and supplying a term
under which the employer cannot terminate employment in bad faith. Id. at 534; see,
e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Minn. 1983); Smith, Batch-
elder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 682, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1979); Woolley v.
Hofflnann-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 295, 491 A.2d 1257, 1260-61, modified mem. on
other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985); K. McCulloch, Termination of Employ-
ment: Employer and Employee Rights 40,011-40,012 (1984); Strasser, The Death of a
Doctrine?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 20, 1986, at 1. But see Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp.
849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (valid express contract for employment at will and a contradic-
tory implied contract held improper).
2. See Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 669 &
n.145 (1960); Note, The Enforcibility of a Promise Not to Compete After an Employment
at Will, 29 Colum. L. Rev. 347 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Employment at Will].
A number of jurisdictions are hearing these cases for the first time and their solutions
to the problem are varied. In Tennessee, for example, no fewer than six cases were de-
cided in 1984 and 1985 alone, with the state's lower courts very confused over what
constitutes consideration in individual situations. Late in 1984, the Tennessee Supreme
Court finally adopted a rationale-that of forging a binding unilateral contract out of an
invalid bilateral contract. See Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d
28, 34 (Tenn. 1984) (quoting Hoyt v. Hoyt, 213 Tenn. 117, 128-29, 372 S.W.2d 300, 305
(1963)). For 1984 cases in Tennessee struggling with the issue, see Dearborn Chem. Co.
v. Rhodes (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1985) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States
library, Omni file) (trial court decision reversed which had held that future employment
was inadequate consideration for a noncompetition clause which was not part of the orig-
inal employment agreement); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d
28, 30, 37 (Tenn. 1984) (court of appeals decision reversed because it held covenants
signed two weeks after employment began unenforceable for lack of consideration);
Frank's Food Co. v. Parsons (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 1984) (available May 6, 1986, on
LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (case dismissed because covenant lacked any additional
feature beneficial to the employee and therefore was without sufficient consideration; trial
court had upheld convenant where employment continued for three years after execution
of covenant); Holt v. Cumberland Bolt & Screw, Inc. (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1984)
(available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (both trial and appellate
courts found continued employment sufficient consideration to support a noncompetition
convenant); Corroon & Black, Inc. v. Lee (Tenn. CL App. Feb. 16, 1984) (available May
6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (trial and appellate courts found no consid-
eration to support restrictive covenant where parties could terminate employment with-
out any notice), rev'd, unpublished op. (Tenn. Apr. 1, 1985) (available May 6, 1986, on
LEXIS, States library, Omni fie) (lower courts were reversed because the continuation of
employment for seven years after execution of the covenant provided adequate considera-
tion).
There has been a similar flurry of litigation recently in Delaware, Indiana, Minnesota
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The basic issue' is whether the consideration given by the employer for
a noncompetition covenant is illusory because of the employer's un-
restricted right to terminate employment unilaterally at any time even
without cause.4 If an employee signed a restrictive covenant and the em-
ployer terminated the employment agreement without cause either before
employment had begun, or one day, one week or one month after em-
ployment had begun, is the employee bound by the covenant? If the em-
ployer's promise to employ is illusory, where is the consideration for the
employee's promise not to compete? The cases do not directly address
this issue.'
and Pennsylvania. See Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.
1978) (applying Minnesota law); Gagliardi Bros. v. Caputo, 538 F. Supp. 525 (E.D. Pa.
1982) (applying Pennsylvania law); Comfort, Inc. v. McDonald, No. 1066(S) (Del. Ch.
June 1, 1984) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Research &
Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301 (Del. Ch. 1983); Hammermill Paper Co. v.
Palese, No. 712B (Del. Ch. June 14, 1983) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States
library, Omni file); Leatherman v. Management Advisors, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1048 (Ind.
1983); Woodward Ins., Inc. v. White, 437 N.E.2d 59 (Ind. 1982); Campbell v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054 (Ind. App. 1980); Advanced Copy Prods., Inc. v. Cool, 173 Ind,
App. 363, 363 N.E.2d 1070 (1977); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626
(Minn. 1983); National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736 (Minn. 1982); Da-
vies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1980); Kari Family Clinic v.
Bohnen, 349 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing &
Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977); George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464
Pa. 475, 347 A.2d 311 (1975); Maintenance Specialties, Inc. v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327, 314
A.2d 279 (1974); Wainwright's Travel Serv. v. Schmolk, 500 A.2d 476 (Pa. Super. 1985).
3. Past consideration may arise as an issue in covenants not to compete when the
employer requests the covenant after the initial employment agreement was reached or
after employment commenced. Courts hold that past consideration is not consideration,
see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, Contracts § 4.2, at 135, § 5.14, at 192 (2d ed. 1977), but
disagree about whether the covenant is ancillary to the employment agreement. See infra
Part I.A. 1. The covenants do not present a past consideration issue, however. The em-
ployee is not saying that in consideration for wages paid last week, he will not compete.
Nor does the employer have a pre-existing duty to retain the employee. Past considera-
tion would be an issue if the employee made the promise not to compete only after the
employment relationship had ended, as where an employer offers an employee a pension
after the employee has already retired.
4. See Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924) ("If for any
reason the promise of one party is not binding upon him, it is not a sufficient considera-
tion for the promise of the other and the contract is void for want of consideration.");
Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (mutual.
ity of obligation does not exist at outset of agreement where one party reserves the right
to terminate without cause), petition denied, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1981); 1 S. Williston,
A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 105, at 418 (3d ed. 1957 & Supp. 1985) ("an agree-
ment wherein one party reserves the right to cancel at his pleasure cannot create a
contract").
5. One court that considered these questions was "troubled by the phrase 'termina-
ble at will' that is employed in the. . . opinions in the absence of supportive analysis."
Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Unfor-
tunately, the court declined to provide an analysis, concluding instead that the opinions
without analysis nevertheless "represent[ed] the governing law in Florida on which em-
ployers and employees have relied for over twenty years and appellee ha[d] not provided
[the court] with argument sufficiently persuasive to disregard them." Id. See infra note
i0.
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Two important factors contribute to confusion in this employment at
will area. First, courts are concerned that covenants not to compete may
constitute restraints of trade.' As such, the covenants not to compete are
analyzed under a standard of reasonableness. The current analysis re-
quires that an enforceable restraint of trade covenant be 1) ancillary to a
valid existing employment contract or, alternatively, separately sup-
ported by adequate consideration; 2) specific as to time and territory; 3)
necessary for protection of the employer's legitimate business interests;
and 4) neither unduly harsh toward the employee nor injurious to the
public.7
This analysis has led some courts to treat these cases as a separate class
that need not follow only contract law, but instead should be viewed as
"employment" cases or "restraint of trade" cases.' Courts applying a
restraint of trade analysis generally gloss over traditional contract analy-
6. See K. McCullogh, supra note 1, 40,011, at 40,023 n.(v). As part of the reasona-
bleness analysis, courts closely examine the effect that enforcement of a restrictive conve-
nant will have on both the employee and the employer. See 6A A. Corbin, Contracts
§ 1394, at 101-02 (1962) ("Disproportionate hardship to the party against whom enforce-
ment is sought has always been regarded as reason for refusing equitable remedies.").
7. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 16-20, at 602-03; 6A A. Corbin, supra
note 6, § 1394, at 101-02; D. Dobbs, Law of Remedies § 12.26, at 934-35 (1973); Restate-
ment of Contracts § 515 (1932); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 & comments b,
g (1981); Blake, supra note 2, at 643, 648-49; Employment at Will, supra note 2, at 348.
But see Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 1303 (Del. Ch. 1983) ("The
elements necessary to constitute a valid restrictive covenant are the same as those re-
quired for a contract in general, namely, a mutual assent to the terms of the agreement by
all parties and the existence of consideration.").
8. Blake, supra note 2, at 643-44 ("in the application of the reasonableness test, al-
most from the beginning more emphasis was placed on protecting the employee from
overly heavy burdens and less on the conclusiveness of contractual terms"); cf Pettit,
Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U.L. Rev. 551, 561-62 (1983) ("Judges often decide
these disputes without inquiry into questions of contract formation; frequently, they
make no effort to explain the contracting process or even to use contract terminology.").
But the New Jersey Supreme Court in Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 99 NJ.
284, 491 A.2d 1257, modified mem. on other grounds, 101 NJ. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985),
questioned whether it should analyze employment cases on a traditional contractual basis
rather than in master-servant or special employment terms. See id. at 289-90, 491 A.2d
at 1260. The eagerness of courts to look at employment at will in terms of an implied
contract may lead to increased attention to contract law in evaluating restrictive cove-
nants.
Many states have statutes regulating the enforcement of restrictive covenants. Most of
the statutes prohibit covenants except under certain circumstances and where certain
requirements are met. See K. McCulloch, supra note 1, 51,103. Alabama, for example,
holds covenants not to compete void whether they are reasonable or not unless they are
ancillary to the sale of the goodwill of a business or dissolution of a partnership. See Ala.
Code § 8-1-1 (1975). Oregon's statute makes a noncompetition agreement in an employ-
ment contract void and unenforceable unless it is part of the original employment agree-
ment or is entered into upon the subsequent advancement of the employee and meets
other requirements. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 653.295 (1985). For additional state-by-state
analysis of statutes and case law on employee convenants, see generally Handler &
Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 669 (1982) (summarizing precedents and public policy considerations of covenants
in restraint of trade, and formulation by the Second Restatement).
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sis and evaluate the overall reasonableness of enforcing the covenant.'
They often ignore the at will nature of the agreement as a distinguishing
factor. 1o
The second source of confusion is that the vast majority of these ac-
tions are for equitable remedies." Courts in such cases demand more
than the minimum requisites of offer, acceptance and consideration
needed to enforce a contact at law.12 These cases draw on principles of
both law and equity, further clouding the "difference. . .between the
9. See, e.g., Olin Water Servs. v. Midland Research Laboratories, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
412, 414 (E.D. Ark. 1984), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985); Barnes Group,
Inc., v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 460 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F.
Supp. 655, 658 (D. Or. 1965); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 682-83,
406 A.2d 1310, 1311-12 (1979); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 41,
378 A.2d 1164, 1166 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam); see also 6A A. Corbin, supra note 6,
§ 1395, at 107 (although consideration is a factor in determining validity of a promise in
restraint of trade, "reasonableness" is also a requisite for enforcement).
Where customer lists, trade secrets or confidential information are involved, courts
focus on irreparable harm, and reasonableness often receives only passing attention. See,
e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1338-40 (9th Cir.
1980) (customer lists and trade secrets); Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d
1264, 1269-70 (8th Cir. 1978) (confidential business information); Olin Water Servs. v.
Midland Research Laboratories, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (customer
lists), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985); Comfort, Inc. v. McDonald, No.
1066(S) (Del. Ch. June 1, 1984) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni
file) (confidential information).
One judge explained the shallow treatment of consideration and courts' emphasis on
reasonableness by stating that "[iut has long been the rule at common law, that contracts
in restraint of trade made independently of a . . .contract of employment are void as
against public policy regardless of the valuableness of the consideration exchanged
therein." George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 487, 347 A.2d 311, 317 (1975)
(Roberts, J., concurring) (quoting Morgan's Home Equip. Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa..
618, 628-29, 136 A.2d 838, 844-45 (1957)); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898) (no restraint of trade covenant can be enforced
unless it is ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S.
211 (1899); E. Farnsworth, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 336 (a nonancillary restraint is neces-
sarily unreasonable; the promise that imposes the restraint is therefore unenforceable per
se); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 187 (1981) (courts focus on restraint of trade
and rule of reason).
10. In typical reasonableness analysis there is no special treatment for at will employ-
ment. The reasonableness standard simply refers to employment relationships, regardless
of the terms. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. One commentator suggested that
the problem "has been made easier in the vast majority of cases by the presence of other
factors whose importance, from a legalistic standpoint, completely overshadowed the fact
that the employment was at will." Employment at Will, supra note 2, at 349.
11. See D. Dobbs, supra note 7, § 12.26 at 934-35 (reasonable restrictions are valid
and enforceable by injunction); 11 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts
§ 1446, at 1008 (3d ed. 1968) (injunction is the usual method of enforcing convenants);
Note, Economic and Critical Analyses of the Law of Covenants Not to Compete, 72 Geo.
L.J. 1425, 1428 & n.23, 1432-33 (equitable remedy granted because of difficulty of com-
puting damages and need to prevent future injury; court has no "market price" by which
to measure the employer's damages); see also Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119
N.H. 679, 682, 406 A.2d 1310, 1311 (1979) (even if the covenant is unreasonable, em-
ployer still may be entitled to equitable relief in the form of reformation or partial
enforcement).
12. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
COVENANTS AND CONSIDERATION
validity of a contract [at law] ... and the enforcement of such a con-
tract in equity."1 3 A bilateral contract that is valid at law will not always
be enforceable in equity because an equitable analysis goes beyond formal
contract principles and requires compliance with doctrines of fairness.1 4
For example, in traditional contract cases at law, courts have refused to
address the adequacy of consideration. 5 The courts in employment at
will cases, however, go beyond simply determining whether any consid-
eration was given, and judge the adequacy of the consideration. 6
The proper analysis of noncompetition covenants in employments at
will should address two separate problems: whether there is considera-
tion to support the covenant, and whether it is fair under the particular
circumstances of the case to enforce a covenant that is presented after the
employment relationship is already established. The first problem is one
of contract formation, the second of unconscionability or avoidance due
to coercion.
In 1960, Professor Harlan M. Blake claimed that employment cove-
nants not to compete were a necessary, albeit "inefficient and often unfair
device for allocating the burden of certain business risks."' 7 He con-
cluded that "[tihere have been many cases of gross misuse of [employee]
covenants [not to compete] in the past, in part because of the failure of
many courts to engage in a discriminating analysis of their impact before
enforcing them. There is evidence that this attitude is rapidly chang-
ing."'" This Note argues that, since 1960, the changes Professor Blake
anticipated have not completely materialized. The courts do analyze the
impact of covenants on employers and employees alike, but courts adju-
dicating covenants not to compete in employment at will cases often find
little discriminating analysis to rely on as precedent. Instead, ihey ana-
lyze the issue under the guise of consideration, while their analyses actu-
ally focus on fairness, an element that has never been required for
consideration.
Part I of this Note considers the three types of analyses courts typi-
cally apply to noncompetition covenants in employments at will. Part H
argues that a plausible and more predictable doctrinal rationale justifies
13. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 687 (3d Cir. 1924).
14. See Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 630 n.5 (Minn. 1983)
(noncompetition covenants treated as special circumstance and therefore those cases are
not decided strictly on formal contract principles). See supra note 8.
15. See Spaulding v. Benenati, 57 N.Y.2d 418, 423, 442 N.E.2d 1244, 1246, 456
N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (1982); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-3, at 136-39; Re-
statement (Second) Contracts § 79, at 201 comment c.
16. See, eg., Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 1305 (Del. Ch.
1983) (sufficiency); Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983)
(adequacy); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 42-43, 378 A.2d 1164,
1167 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam) (sufficiency); Amdar, Inc. v. Satterwhite, 37 N.C.
App. 410, 414, 246 S.E.2d 165, 167 (sufficiency), review denied, 295 N.C. 645, 248 S.E.2d
249 (1978).
17. Blake, supra note 2, at 691.
18. Id.
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finding consideration for a restrictive covenant in an employment at will.
By articulating a broadly applicable underlying rationale, courts would
better serve both parties. Employees at will would have a clearer notion
of the circumstances under which such covenants will be enforced
against them, and employers, particularly national employers, would
have a more predictable means of protecting their legitimate
expectations.
I. CURRENT ANALYSES OF THE CONSIDERATION THAT SUPPORTS
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANT
A. The Requirement of Consideration Hinges on Whether the
Covenant is Ancillary to Employment
The first requirement of enforceability under the restraint of trade
analysis is that the covenant not to compete be ancillary to a valid ex-
isting employment contract or, alternatively, separately supported by ad-
equate consideration.9 Since consideration other than the employment
is necessary only for a nonancillary covenant, the meaning of the term
"ancillary" is important to the requirement of consideration.2"
1. The Dispute Over the Meaning of Ancillary
Courts generally hold that a covenant signed prior to, contemporane-
ously with, or any time during employment is ancillary to employment, 2I
and therefore is supported by the same consideration that supports the
employment agreement.22 According to this majority analysis, consider-
ation separate from the employment relationship is necessary only when
the covenant is entered after employment terminates or when no employ-
ment relationship exists. This view is held to apply even in an employ-
ment at will.23 The minority of courts have urged a different meaning of
19. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
20. See Jacobson & Co. v. International Env't Corp., 427 Pa. 439, 447-51, 235 A.2d
612, 617-19 (1967) (the ancillarity and consideration issues are closely intertwined).
21. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188, comment a Reporter's note (1981)
(covenant may be ancillary if signed contemporaneously with or soon after employment,
or any time before termination). See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
22. See Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Blair, 10 N.C. App. 323, 332-33, 178 S.E.2d 781, 787
(1971) (applying Georgia law); Bouska v. Wright, 49 Or. App. 763, 767-68, 621 P.2d 69,
71-72 (1980); see also K. McCulloch, supra note 1, $ 51,103.
Common law contract analysis assumes that a contract is not enforceable unless each
party does, or promises to do, something he is not legally obligated to do, or refrains, or
promises to refrain, from doing something he is legally privileged to do. See J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-1, at 134; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71
(1981) In a bilateral contract, the promise of each promisor must be bargained for and
given in exchange for the other's promise. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-
1, at 134-35; see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981). In a unilateral
contract, the performance must be bargained for and given in exchange for the promisor's
promise. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-15, at 157; see also Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981).
23. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 187-188 & § 188 comment g (1981)
1128 [Vol. 54
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ancillary, arguing that a covenant is not ancillary when it is not reason-
ably contemporaneous with the initiation of employment.24 Thus, when
the at will employment relationship has been established for a significant
period without a restrictive covenant, the covenant is not considered an-
cillary to the employment, and the employer must provide separate con-
sideration to support the covenant.
25
This dispute over when a covenant is ancillary masks the important
issue in these cases: whether the employment relationship alone can sup-
port such a covenant, no matter when in that relationship the covenant is
executed, given the potentially illusory nature of an employment at
will. 26 All of the employer's promises to pay salary, bonuses and the like
are illusory because the employer has the unfettered right to discharge
the employee at any time. The employer need not employ the employee
for even one day. In an employment for a five-year term with a two-year
noncompetition covenant, there is a bargained-for exchange. But in the
case of an employment at will, is a two-year noncompetition covenant
bargained for in exchange for an employment of one day, one month, one
year, two years or a reasonable time? A separate analysis for at will em-
ployment is necessary to take this difference into account.
In an employment at will, a mere promise to employ is illusory and
therefore is not consideration. However, if the employee's promise not to
compete is supported by the employer's performance (for example, pay-
ment of salary) as long as the employment continues, then there is con-
sideration for the covenant27 regardless of whether it is presented after
the commencement of employment and regardless of whether the em-
ployment continues for only one day after the covenant is made. In an
employment for a term, a promise to employ is consideration for a cove-
nant executed at the same time as the employment contract. However, a
(restraint may be ancillary to a relationship although, as in case of employment at will, no
employment contract involved).
24. See, eg., Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (re-
strictive covenant signed subsequent to employment at will is not ancillary and backdat-
ing subsequent restrictive covenant four months does not make covenant ancillary to
employment) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C.
166, 168, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1964) (any restrictive covenant agreed to after employ-
ment relationship established must be based upon new consideration); George W. Kistler,
Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 484-85, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (1975) (valid restrictive covenant
need not appear in initial contract, but if agreed on at later time, must be supported by
new consideration); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 33
(Tenn. 1984) (court stated that a covenant signed prior to, contemporaneously with or
shortly after employment begins is part of the original agreement); Environmental Prods.
Co. v. Duncan, 285 S.E.2d 889, 890 (V. Va. 1981) (when covenant not to compete exe-
cuted after employment has begun without such restriction, there must be new considera-
tion to support it).
25. A nonancillary covenant requires separate consideration. See supra note 7, and
accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of illusoriness, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
27. Continued employment is consideration because the employer is refraining from
exercising a legal privilege to terminate the employment. He has thereby provided
consideration.
1986] 1129
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covenant executed after employment begins is unenforceable for lack of
consideration because of the employer's pre-existing duty to continue
employment.18
Judicial analysis of noncompetition covenants in employment at will
generally follows one of three views of what constitutes consideration.
Depending on the view prevailing in a given jurisdiction, an employee's
promise to refrain from competing will be considered binding if there is:
1) continued at will employment; 29 2) consideration other than mere con-
tinued at will employment; 30 or 3) any consideration, so long as it is bar-
gained for by the parties.31
2. Majority View: Ancillary Covenant Is One Entered Any Time
During an Employment at Will Relationship
Courts in the majority of jurisdictions find continued employment to
be sufficient consideration to support the noncompetition covenant no
matter when during the employment relationship the covenant was
signed.32
Although no minimum period of continued employment has been es-
tablished as adequate consideration for a restrictive covenant, covenants
tend to be enforced when employment has continued at least several
months after the covenant was executed.33 Clearly, employment for one
instant is not consideration. Nor will courts deem a promise of employ-
28. The pre-existing duty rule states that "where a party does or promises to do what
he is already legally obligated to do or promises to refrain from doing or refrains from
doing what he is not legally privileged to do he has not incurred detriment," J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-7, at 145, and thus has not provided consideration for
another's promise.
29. See infra Part I.A.2.
30. See infra Part I.A.3.
3 1. See infra Part I.B.
32. See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Benda, 689 F.2d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying
Illinois law), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983); Dickinson v. Auto Center Mfg. Co., 639
F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (applying Florida law); Olin Water Servs. v.
Midland Research Laboratories, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 412, 415 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (applying
Arkansas and Kansas law), appeal dismissed, 774 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985); Barnes
Group, Inc. v. O'Brien, 591 F. Supp. 454, 461 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (applying Ohio law);
Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 92-93, 229 So. 2d 480, 483 (1969); Wright &
Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); McQuown v.
Lakeland Window Cleaning Co., 136 So. 2d 370, 371-72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Tasty
Box Lunch Co. v. Kennedy, 121 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Farm Bureau
Serv. v. Kohls, 203 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1972); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md.
App. 561, 567, 464 A.2d 1104, 1107-08 (1983); Reed, Roberts Assocs. v. Bailenson, 537
S.W.2d 238, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H.
679, 683, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312 (1979); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 153 N.J. Super.
37, 43, 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam); Matlock v. Data Processing
Sec., Inc., 607 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), modified, 618 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.
1981).
33. See, e.g., Daughtry v. Capital Gas Co., 285 Ala. 89, 92-93, 229 So. 2d 480, 483
(1969) (eight months' continued employment sufficient for two-year covenant); Simko,
Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 567, 464 A.2d 1104, 1107-08 (1983) (ten years'
continued employment sufficient for one-year covenant); Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig
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ment for as long as the employer wants it a bargained-for consideration.
Employment must continue for at least a reasonable time.' This ap-
proach, based on an assessment of the reasonableness of enforcing the
covenant, allows courts great flexibility.
In many cases the employee has been threatened with dismissal for
refusing to sign the covenant.35 This threat is viewed as reinforcing the
argument that continued employment is consideration because it under-
scores the employer's freedom to terminate at any time3 6 and tends to
show that continued employment was bargained for. If the employer re-
frains from terminating employment in exchange for the covenant, that is
valuable consideration."
The majority view that continued employment is consideration does
not treat the parties unfairly, even though the reasoning behind the deci-
sions is not always clear. The rationale may be that the employer has
impliedly promised continued employment 38 or that the employee is es-
topped from arguing lack of consideration once he has accepted complete
performance of the agreement as promised. 9 It may also be that the
Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 43, 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam) (three
years' continued employment sufficient for one-year covenant).
34. See, e.g., Simko, Inc. v. Graymar Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 567, 464 A.2d 1104,
1107-08 (1983) (what constitutes substantial performance depends on facts and circum-
stances of particular case); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28,
35 (Tenn. 1984) (it is possible that employment for only a short period of time would be
insufficient consideration under the circumstances); accord J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra
note 3, § 2-13, at 45-46 (parties silent as to material term may intend that the term be
supplied by implication; U.C.C. substitutes reasonable time, reasonable price); Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 33 comment d (the time for performance is a reasonable
time); id. § 204 comment d (where there is in fact no agreement, the court should supply
a term that comports with community standards of fairness and policy).
35. See, eg., Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 1302 (Del. Ch.
1983); Tasco, Inc. v. Winkel, 281 N.W.2d 280, 282 (Iowa 1979); Simko, Inc. v. Graymar
Co., 55 Md. App. 561, 568-69, 464 A.2d 1104, 1108 (1983); Kari Family Clinic v.
Bolnen, 349 N.W.2d 868, 869 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Matlock v. Data Processing Sec.,
Inc., 607 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), modified, 618 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. 1981).
36. A New Jersey court went further, stating that verbalized threat of immediate dis-
charge was not necessary to find the consideration needed to support the restrictive cove-
nant. "Such a consequence can be inferred from conduct." Hogan v. Bergen Brunswig
Corp., 153 N.J. Super. 37, 43, 378 A.2d 1164, 1167 (App. Div. 1977) (per curiam).
37. See supra notes 22, 32 and accompanying text.
38. See Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram Assoc., 622 S.W.2d 681, 685 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981). See supra note 1. The implied contract exception to employment at will
creates a contract by operation of law, imposing on the employer an obligation to termi-
nate an at will employee only in good faith and for just cause. See Scholtes v. Signal
Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487, 492 (W.D. Ark. 1982) (detrimental reliance on em-
ployer's assurance of continued employment by passing up other jobs results in implied
contract exception to employment at will); Martin v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 109 Ill. App.
3d 596, 603, 440 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (1982) (oral promise of permanent employment is
enforceable when employee consideration is giving up right to accept another job ofrer).
39. Complete performance does not mean that the employer can terminate unilater-
ally at will. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Rather, it suggests that the em-
ployer promised to continue employment for a reasonable time beyond execution of the
covenant. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The employer may argue as well
that the employee is estopped by the requirement to mitigate damages.
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employee has made an offer to the employer looking to a unilateral con-
tract." The offer becomes irrevocable once the employer performs or
begins performing, so the employee's resignation prevents the employer
from completing performance. Under those circumstances the employer
can enforce the employee's promise.
Because many jurisdictions are recognizing exceptions to the doctrine
of employment at will and are limiting the employer's ability to terminate
the employment relationship unilaterally without cause, 4 1 a refusal to
recognize continued employment as adequate consideration for a restric-
tive covenant executed after employment has begun may also develop.
Continued employment is a pre-existing duty in employment contracts
for a term and thus is inadequate consideration for a restrictive covenant
entered into after the commencement of a fixed term employment con-
tract. As the doctrine of employment at will erodes, more courts may
adopt the view that because the employer is not really free to terminate
employment at any time, continued employment is merely a pre-existing
duty in at will employment as well. If so, those courts might no longer
deem mere continued employment to be consideration.
3. Minority View: Ancillary Covenant Is One Entered
Contemporaneously with or Shortly After Beginning
the Employment at Will Relationship
Courts following the minority view distinguish between a noncompeti-
tion covenant agreed to as part of the terms of the original employment
and one agreed to after the employment has already begun. Under this
view, continued employment alone cannot support a noncompetition
covenant that was not one of the terms of the original employment agree-
ment.42 A few courts following this approach cite the pre-existing duty
40. See Comfort, Inc. v. McDonald, No. 1066(S) (Del. Ch. June 1, 1984) (available
May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (where employee voluntarily termi-
nated employment, covenant enforceable because supported by employer's performance);
see also Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (W.D. Ark. 1982)
(implied contract analysis reaches same result as unilateral contract approach). See gen.
erally Note, Challenging the Employment-at-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract
Theory, 16 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 449, 450 (1983) (advocating implied contract analysis that
protects reasonable expectations of employees and employers). However, one court has
held that where there is a valid written or express contract for employment at will, there
cannot also be a contradictory implied contract embracing the same subject matter. See
Crain v. Burroughs Corp., 560 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
41. See supra note 1.
42. See National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn. 1982);
Davies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1980); Nooter Corp.
v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (decided under Pennsylvania law);
Forrest Paschal Mach. Co. v. Milholen, 27 N.C. App. 678, 685, 220 S.E.2d 190, 195-96
(1975); Wilmar, Inc. v. Liles, 13 N.C. App. 71, 77, 185 S.E.2d 278, 282 (1971); George
W. Kistler, Inc. v. O'Brien, 464 Pa. 475, 484-85, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (1975); Central Ad-
justment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 38 (Tenn. 1984) (Brock, J., dissenting);
Associated Dairies, Inc. v. Ray Moss Farms, Inc., 205 Tenn. 268, 274-75, 326 S.W.2d
458, 460-61 (1959); Schneller v. Hayes, 176 Wash. 115, 118-19, 28 P.2d 273, 274-75
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rule43 and hold that consideration is lacking when the employer's obliga-
tion amounts to no more than that which he has already agreed to do:
employ the employee." Unless the employer incurs additional obliga-
tions or gives other consideration, the covenant is not deemed supported
by valuable consideration." 5
This analysis, however, ignores the terms of the employment at will.
The employer does not have a pre-existing duty to continue the employ-
ment relationship for a fixed term or for a reasonable time or for an
instant.
Some of the minority courts have considered the circumstances under
which the employee leaves in their evaluation of whether consideration
has been provided." When continued employment was held to be suffi-
cient consideration, the employee usually had been threatened with loss
of his job if he refused to sign.47 When additional consideration was re-
quired of the employer, as under this second view, no such threat had
been made.
For many courts following the view that something more than mere
continued employment is necessary, adequate consideration may include
(1934); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 890 (W. Va. 1979); see also Worth Chem.
Corp. v. Freeman, 261 N.C. 780, 781, 136 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1964) (per curiam).
One court explained this as a requirement that "any agreement thereafter not to com-
pete must be in the nature of a new contract based upon a new consideration." James C.
Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166, 168, 134 S.F2d 166, 167 (1964).
The result is the same if the employee resigns or threatens to resign when asked to sign
the covenant, and then is subsequently rehired or continues employment. See Comfort,
Inc. v. McDonald, No. 1066(S) (Del. Ch. June 1, 1984) (available May 6, 1986, on
LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (employee gave two weeks' notice of intent to resign,
then prior to expiration of notice period, asked that employment be continued; employ-
ment was continued and covenant was executed at that time); 4408, Inc. v. Losure, 175
Ind. App. 658, 659, 664, 373 N.E.2d 899, 900, 903 (1978) (agreement to rehire salesman
who resigned when asked to sign covenant was valid consideration to support covenant
he eventually signed).
43. See supra note 28.
44. See Perthou v. Stewart, 243 F. Supp. 655, 658 (D. Or. 1965); Davies & Davies
Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980).
45. These courts might view the newly-presented covenant as a modification of the
original agreement. When the modification of the existing agreement adds a covenant not
to compete, some courts view the covenant as a separate noncompetition agreement of
the parties. See Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983)
(modification adding covenant not to compete is separate agreement requiring separate
consideration because it restrains trade); James C. Greene Co. v. Kelley, 261 N.C. 166,
168, 134 S.E.2d 166, 167 (1964) (noncompetition agreement after employment begins
must be in form of new contract based on new consideration); Farber & Matheson, Be-
yond Promissory Estoppe" Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 903, 920 n.73 (1985) (use of the unilateral contract device to enforce one-sided mod-
ifications of ongoing relationships has found increasing favor).
46. See Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingram, 678 S.W.2d 28, 35 (Tenn. 1984)
("[A] discharge which is arbitrary, capricious or in bad faith clearly has a bearing on
whether a court of equity should enforce a non-competition covenant.").
47. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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additional training,4s receipt of confidential information, 49 a change in
status or salary, 50 a notice of termination provision 5' or some other im-
mediate advantage to the employee.5 2 One such advantage might be the
employer's promise to pay the employee his salary if he cannot find em-
ployment during the restrictive term solely because of the covenant.53 If
protection of the employer's interest is not worth the dollar amount rep-
resented by two or three years' salary, the courts may reason that the
employer is unfairly restraining the employee and therefore cannot claim
irreparable harm before an equity court.54
a. Change in Status or Salary
A beneficial change in status or salary is usually sufficient to support a
restrictive covenant agreed on after initial employment at will. s" Consid-
eration is found when, in addition to continued employment, employees
obtain "substantial economic and professional benefits"5 6 and advance to
otherwise unattainable positions.57 But even when there has been a sal-
ary increase and change in position after signing, a covenant has still
been held unenforceable when the employer made no distinction in his
treatment of signers and non-signers.5s
48. See Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466-67 (Del. Ch. 1977); Da-
vies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1980); M.S. Jacobs &
Assocs. v. Duffley, 452 Pa. 143, 146-47, 303 A.2d 921, 923 (1973).
49. See Davies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980).
50. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
52. This may include a lump-sum bonus or a vested annuity contract. See Stover v.
Gamewell Fire Alarm Tel. Co., 164 A.D. 155, 149 N.Y.S. 650 (1914) (annuity contract).
A profit-sharing plan under the sole control of the employer has been held not sufficient
consideration for a convenant not to compete executed by an established employee. See
Wilmar, Inc. v. Liles, 13 N.C. App. 71, 78-79, 185 S.E.2d 278, 283 (1971).
53. See, e.g., Modem Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 1266-68 (8th Cir.
1978); Amerace Corp. v. Markham, unpublished op. (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 1979)
(cited in Frank's Food Co. v. Parsons (Tenn. Ct. App. June 15, 1984) (available May 6,
1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file)).
54. This may be justified by the economic inefficiency of enforcing a covenant when
the employee's services and information are less valuable to his present employer than to
a potential future employer. See generally Note, Economic and Critical Analyses of the
Law of Covenants not to Compete, 72 Geo. L.J. 1425, 1429 (1984) (economic logic under-
lying the law is often implicit rather than explicit).
55. See, e.g., Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324, 1339
(9th Cir. 1980) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); Research & Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468
A.2d 1301, 1304-05 (Del. Ch. 1983); Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese, No. 712B (Del.
Ch. June 14, 1983) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Faw,
Casson & Co. v. Cranston, 375 A.2d 463, 466-67 (Del. Ch. 1977); Davies & Davies
Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1980); M.S. Jacobs & Assocs. v. Duf-
fley, 452 Pa. 143, 147, 303 A.2d 921, 923 (1973).
56. Davies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980).
57. See id.; see also Hammermill Paper Co. v. Palese, No. 712B (Del. Ch. June 14,
1983) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (beneficial change in
status is enough; so is promise of employment with employer's successor business entity).
58. See Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983) (cove-
nant unenforceable for lack of consideration where other employees who did not sign
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b. Notice Provision
Written notice of termination provisions from either party59 have been
held sufficient consideration for an at will employee's noncompetition
covenant.' Notice of termination is not technical consideration on the
employer's part, and it probably is not bargained for by the employee in
exchange for a noncompetition covenant. Some courts treat notice provi-
sions as they do continued employment and impose an implied require-
ment of good faith on the employer's part which remedies the illusory
nature of the employer's termination at will provision.
6 1
The minority courts are misinterpreting the reasonableness require-
ment in restraint of trade agreements and mislabeling it as one that looks
for additional consideration beyond continued employment. 62 They do
not separate the consideration question from the possibility of duress or
coercion that arises when the covenant is presented after the employee
received same benefits as employee who signed). Although the court did not explain, its
assumption must have been that the employer suffered no legal detriment when he gave
benefits to the employee who signed.
59. A notice of termination provision is a promise that the party will continue em-
ployment at least for the period of notice before terminating. For example, if the parties
have a 30-day notice provision, the employment must continue for 30 days beyond the
date either party gives notice of termination. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3,
§ 4-17, at 161-62; 1A A. Corbin, supra note 6, § 164, at 83-85.
60. See Wrentham Co. v. Cann, 345 Mass. 737, 739-41, 189 N.F-2d 559, 560-61
(1963); Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 682, 406 A.2d 1310, 1312
(1979); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-17, at 161.
Although courts have found consideration in the requirement to give notice of termina-
tion, they agree that no consideration exists when a party has the unrestricted right to
terminate the contract at any time without notice. See Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin,
1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924); Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc. v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216,
218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); see also Maintenance Specialties v. Gottus, 455 Pa. 327,
330 n.1, 314 A.2d 279, 281 n.1 (1974) (notice provision is not enough when employer has
sole discretion to do away with notice). That party makes no promise at all and there is
not sufficient consideration for the promise of the other. Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Pres-
cott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Pick Kwik Food Stores, Inc.
v. Tenser, 407 So. 2d 216, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). The notice provision therefore
must be a requirement enforceable against both parties; it cannot be an obligation im-
posed only on the employer or the employee alone.
If, for instance, an entirely valid contract contain [sic] a provision for its termi-
nation by one party on notice to the other, though enforcible [sic] at law, courts
of equity will not, because of such provision, enforce it by granting equitable
relief, as specific performance, but will leave the aggrieved party to his remedy
at law. This is because the court will not grant equitable relief on a contract
where one party can nullify its action by exercising his reserved power to termi-
nate it.
Meurer Steel Barrel Co., 1 F.2d at 688.
61. See Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 119 N.H. 679, 682,406 A.2d, 1310, 1312
(1979); 3A A. Corbin, supra note 8, § 647, at 105-06 (1960). See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
In Collier Cobb & Associates, Inc. v. Leak, 61 N.C. App. 249, 300 S.E.2d 583 (1983),
the court held that a notice provision creates no new rights. See id. at 253, 300 S.F2d at
585. Rather, the mutual exchange of promises to give notice supports only the termina-
tion and modification portions and not the entire agreement. Id., 300 S.E.2d at 585.
62. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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has changed his position in reliance on employment without such a cove-
nant. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the restraint of trade analysis, 63
particularly its failure to identify employments at will as worthy of spe-
cial treatment, may lead courts hearing these cases on first impression to
engage in this mistaken analysis of consideration.
The distinction drawn by the minority courts is not a consideration
issue, but a fairness issue. Treating covenants as supported by the em-
ployment agreement, even though they were not negotiated by the parties
and were presented to the employee on the first day or within the first
few months of employment, creates the impression of unfairness to the
employee." This result may be what leads the minority courts to look
for additional consideration. They may be using the pre-existing duty
rule and the doctrine of consideration to avoid coercion. In what the
minority terms an ancillary covenant, there is no coercion because the
employee knew about the covenant. This point is separate, however,
from whether there was consideration.
B. Only a Bargained-For Advantage Can Supply Consideration
A small number of courts focus on a traditional bargain theory of con-
sideration.65 These courts reject the view that promotions and compen-
sation increases are always consideration because they hold that in order
for an act to constitute consideration for a promise it must have been
"bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."66 One judge, in a
63. See Dearborn Chem. Corp. v. Rhodes (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1985) (available
May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) ("There is no inflexible formula ...
Each case must stand or fall on its own facts."); Frank's Food Co. v. Parsons (Tenn. Ct.
App. June 15, 1984) (available May 6, 1986, on LEXIS, States library, Omni file) (same);
E. Farnsworth, supra note 1, § 5.3 at 336 ("This rule of reason is inevitably imprecise and
leaves cases to be resolved on their particular facts, including general economic condi-
tions. . . .The imprecision. . . is compounded because most claimants seek injunctive
relief and, in denying such relief, courts often fail to indicate whether damages could have
been recovered had they been sought."); Blake, supra note 2, at 649 ("formulation is so
general as to throw little light on specific detailed problems").
64. See National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1982)
("practice of not telling prospective employees all of the conditions of employment until
after the employees have accepted the job. . . takes undue advantage of the inequality
between the parties"); E. Farnsworth, supra note 1, at 338 ("Because post-employment
restraints are often the product of unequal bargaining power and may inflict unantici-
pated hardship on the employee, they are scrutinized with more care than are covenants
in the sale of a business.").
65. See, e.g., Freeman v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983)
(covenant that is not bargained for and does not provide employee with advantages is
unenforceable for lack of consideration); National Recruiters, Inc. v. Cashman, 323
N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn. 1982) (covenant not bargained for unenforceable unless sup-
ported by independent consideration); Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 163 W. Va. 420, 427, 257
S.E.2d 885, 890 (1979) ("Common law principles governing employment contracts
should not be employed to supply consideration for a non-competition covenant where
such provision was not freely bargained for by the parties.").
66. Restatement of Contracts § 75 (1932); see Collier Cobb & Assocs. v. Leak, 61
N.C. App. 249, 253, 300 S.E.2d 583, 585 (1983) (notice provision for termination sup-
ports only the termination portion of the agreement, and is not consideration for a restric-
1136 (Vol. 54
COVENANTS AND CONSIDERATION
dissenting opinion, refused to acknowledge that a covenant executed
years before promotions and salary increases were given could have been
given in exchange for those promotions and salary increases.6' He be-
lieved that the covenants were "merely imposed upon the employees af-
ter their employment began."68
Courts requiring evidence of a traditional bargain stress that covenants
signed soon after the start of employment are not supported by consider-
ation as part of the original agreement because of the absence of free
bargaining: "Even if [the employee] is notified of the restrictive covenant
on the first day of his new employment, he has foreclosed his other op-
tions at that point and has little choice but to sign."69 One way of view-
ing this is that the employee frequently has no bargaining power once he
is employed and can easily be coerced. 0 This, however, is not an issue of
consideration; it is one of fairness.
Noncompetition covenants signed a substantial period of time after the
original employment agreement also have been held unenforceable be-
cause the parties did not bargain for the restrictions and the employees
received no additional benefits for agreeing to them."'
II. RECOMMENDATION
The courts should expressly adopt the unilateral contract approach to
noncompetition covenants in employments at will.' Unilateral contract
tive covenant); Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingrain, 678 S.W.2d 28, 38-39 (Tenn.
1984) (Brock, J., dissenting) (citing Restatement of Contracts § 75 (1932)).
67. See Central Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Ingrain, 678 S.W.2d 28, 38 (Tenn. 1984)
(Brock, J. dissenting).
68. Id. at 38-39.
69. Id. at 38.
70. See Davies & Davies Agency v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 130 (Minn. 1980) (re-
strictive covenant held to be unenforceable for lack of consideration because the em-
ployee was not advised that he was required to sign or would lose his job until 11 days
after starting employment and 28 days after terminating employment with former em-
ployer. See id. at 132-33.
71. See Kari Family Clinic v. Bohnen, 349 N.W.2d 868, 869 (Minn. 1984); Freeman
v. Duluth Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 627, 630 (Minn. 1983); National Recruiters, Inc.
v. Cashman, 323 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn. 1982).
72. Unilateral contracts are an exception to the doctrine of mutuality of obligation.
See Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Martin, 1 F.2d 687, 688 (3d Cir. 1924); J. Calamnari & J.
Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-15, at 157-58; 1A A. Corbin, supra note 6, §§ 152-154, at 2-26;
cf. Wright & Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(mutuality of obligation is not essential where there is other consideration for a contract).
If the offeree complies with the terms of the offer, he has provided consideration for a
promise, even if there was no mutuality of obligation at the outset. J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 3, § 4-15, at 157-58; IA A. Corbin, supra note 6, §§ 152-154, at 2-26;
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79(c) & § 79 comment f (1981).
Few courts, however, expressly apply unilateral contract theory to noncompetition
covenants in employments at will. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. Florida is
one jurisdiction that adopts the unilateral contract approach, though it does not specifi-
cally identify it as such. Florida courts hold that a promise lacking mutuality at incep-
tion becomes binding on the promisor after performance by the promisee. See Wright &
Seaton, Inc. v. Prescott, 420 So. 2d 623, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
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analysis would introduce an element of uniformity in the negotiating and
contracting process without forcing an inequitable and unpredictable re-
sult on the employer.
Courts commonly apply a unilateral contract analysis to the em-
ployer's promise to pay stock options, a bonus or a pension to an at will
employee in order to obtain the employee's continued employment for a
specified period.73 But few courts have so clearly and routinely extended
the analogy to the employee's promises, such as the promise not to com-
pete.74 Treating these agreements as unilateral contracts alleviates some
of the concern with illusoriness that pervades employment at will. 75
We start out with the proposition that, in this case, the parties entered into a
bilateral contract containing mutual executory promises. Appellant agreed to
continue to employ and pay appellee; appellee agreed to work for appellant and
not to compete with it for a period of time in a certain area when his employ-
ment terminated. Appellant retained the right, however, to terminate the em-
ployment without cause. . . . Our inclination is that mutuality of obligation
did not exist when the parties executed their agreement because appellant had a
right to terminate without cause ...
Id. at 626.
This Note argues that precedents are less useful than they could be because courts
following the unilateral contract approach do not identify the contract doctrine they are
applying. See, e.g., Scholtes v. Signal Delivery Serv., 548 F. Supp. 487, 491-92 (W.D.
Ark. 1982) ("[w]hether Arkansas law recognizes this precise [unilateral contract] termi-
nology or not, the same result is reached under Arkansas law by way of the 'implied'
contract").
73. See Gronlund v. Church & Dwight Co., 514 F. Supp. 1304, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(unilateral contract is the general present-day construction of employment stipulations
for severance pay, bonuses or similar incentive plans); Langdon v. Saga Corp., 569 P.2d
524, 527-28 (Okla. 1977) (Personnel manual perceived as offer for a unilateral contract
accepted by employee's continuing to work and foregoing option of termination. The
court "thus conceive[d] personnel policies extending benefits as unilateral offers which
are accepted by continued performance. The requirement of mutuality is met in that no
benefits accrue under those policies until performance has occurred."); see also Research
& Trading Corp. v. Powell, 468 A.2d 1301, 1305 (Del. Ch. 1983) (stock option rights
limit the employer's otherwise absolute right to discharge employee at will without
cause); Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 302, 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (uni-
lateral contract analysis is adequate to find implied promise by employer in personnel
policy manual), modified mem. on other grounds, 101 N.J. 10, 499 A.2d 515 (1985).
74. Karl Llewellyn argued that unilateral contracts were rare and unimportant. K.
Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (Pt. 1), 48 Yale L.J. 1, 36
(1938); see Pettit, supra note 8, at 551. This Note argues that the distinction between
unilateral and bilateral is not irrelevant, and that too many courts treating these cases for
the first time are straining to treat the agreements as bilateral. Those courts could benefit
from a clear expression of the unilateral analysis that is in effect applied by the majority.
75. This is consistent with those courts that hold that when a modification adds a
covenant not to compete to an existing employment agreement, the substituted contract is
a separate agreement of the parties. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. See also
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (an original em-
ployment contract may be modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract when
employee retains employment with knowledge of changed conditions); Langdon v. Saga
Corp., 569 P.2d 524, 527-28 (Okla. 1977) (new personnel manual listing benefits did not
modify any prior contract but became a new contract which defined the employer-em-
ployee relationship during the period the policy was in effect and the employee
performed).
COVENANTS AND CONSIDERATION
The offer to refrain from competition should be viewed as an offer to a
unilateral contract moving from the employee to the employer. 6 The
unilateral contract analysis requires no distinction between covenants ex-
ecuted with commencement of employment and those executed well after
commencement. Therefore, it should be an acceptable approach for both
the majority and minority courts. The covenant becomes enforceable
against the employee only after the employer has accepted the em-
ployee's offer by beginning or completing the requested performance."
The requested performance may include continuing the employment,
paying the employee a flat stated sum or giving the employee some other
immediate benefit.78 Assuming the employee bargains for continued em-
ployment, how much continued employment is necessary? Either a
stated time or, if no time is stated, a reasonable time should be sufficient.
Even if a stated time is agreed on, the employment is not changed into
employment for a fixed term. The stated employment term affects only
the issue of whether the covenant is enforceable.
This unilateral contract approach has the added benefit of creating a
consistent result among those states that recognize the implied contract
exception to the doctrine of employment at will and those states that do
not. If the employment agreement and the restrictive covenant are ana-
lyzed as a unilateral contract, states that do not recognize the implied
contract exception may still honor the at will status of employment by
treating the covenant portion under the unilateral contract theory. In
that case, rather than fulfilling an implied promise by continuing the em-
ployee's employment, the employer, by exercising the option to perform,
accepts the employee's offer to refrain from competition. The employer
is free not to perform, but in that case he foregoes or rejects the em-
ployee's offer not to compete. By dismissing the employee before a rea-
sonable time, the employer has not provided the consideration for the
employee's promise. The covenant in that case fails for lack of
consideration.
When the employer is deemed to have completely performed what was
76. The employee's promise can be characterized as an offer even though it was not
initiated by the employee. When the employee agrees not to compete, the employee has
offered to refrain from competition, when in fact the employee did not initiate such an
offer. The same is true when the "offer" moves in the reverse direction, that is when the
employer promises a pension or a bonus, so it should not be an obstacle here. See Pine
River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983) ("\Whether a proposal is
meant to be an offer for a unilateral contract is determined by the outward manifestations
of the parties, not by their subjective intentions.").
77. The employer's performance is a condition precedent to the employee's duty of
performance, that is, performance of the act is the acceptance of the offer. J. Calamari &
. Perillo, supra note 3, § 11-3, at 384-85.
78. The employee technically should be able to tell the employer what tendered per-
formance will constitute acceptance. This is unlikely to happen in a real-life situation,
however. The courts will have to imply the performance requested, basing their decisions
on evidence of the negotiations between the parties at the time the covenant was exe-
cuted. This is not substantially different from the current majority analysis.
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requested in exchange for the employee's promise not to compete, the
employee's promise becomes binding and enforceable.79 If the employee
resigns before a reasonable time, the employer may still enforce the cove-
nant under the theory of an option contract: 0 the employer began per-
formance, giving the employee consideration to make the employee's
offer irrevocable, and giving the employer the option to perform. The
employee's resignation constitutes prevention8 '-preventing the em-
ployer from accepting the offer by continuing employment-and thus the
condition imposed on the employer to accept the employee's offer is ex-
cused. The employee still is bound to his promise under the covenant.
CONCLUSION
The courts' approaches toward noncompetition covenants in employ-
ment at will do not clearly explain how or why their results are achieved.
Consequently, many employees may hesitate to bring their claims before
the courts:
For every covenant that finds its way to court, there are thousands
which exercise an in terrorem effect on employees who respect their
contractual obligations and on competitors who fear legal complica-
tions if they employ a covenantor, or who are anxious to maintain gen-
tlemanly relations with their competitors. Thus, the mobility of untold
numbers of employees is restricted by the intimidation of restrictions
whose severity no court would sanction.82
Express adoption of the doctrinal rationale proposed here would re-
move the chilling effect these covenants have on employees by advising
them that the covenant meets the preliminary requirements of contract
formation only when the employer has provided consideration via per-
formance or forebearance. If consideration is not provided, there is no
fairness or reasonableness issue, and the covenant is unenforceable. If
consideration is provided, the employee must expect that the court will
go beyond and address the fairness requirements.
The employer would know that he can safely protect his legitimate
business interests by providing certain advantages to the employee. The
employer retains the freedom to terminate the employment at any time
but is advised of the conditional nature of enforcing the restrictive cove-
nant against the employee in the event he chooses to do so.
Kathryn J. Yates
79. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79(c) & § 79 comment f (1981). See
supra note 72. The offeree who performs under the terms of the offer has provided con-
sideration for a promise.
80. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 3, § 2-27, at 88-90 (option contract arises
when the offeree begins to perform the act requested in an offer to a unilateral contract).
81. See id. § 11-32, at 441-42 (wrongful prevention, substantial hindrance or failure to
cooperate may excuse the fulfillment of a condition precedent).
82. Blake, supra note 2, at 682-83.
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